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Abstract: Malta’s economy, minute by any standard, makes 
for imperfectly competitive market structures. The degree of 
this competition is quite interesting since many firms, in the 
wholesale, retail, as well as in other sectors, tend to form part of 
oligopolistic structures, such as banking, mobile phone service 
provision, internet service providers, bottled-water manufacturers, 
insurance, food importers, supermarkets, and new and used car 
importers. Oligopsony, or the concentration of market power in 
the hands of a few buyers, may be considered as the other side 
of the coin. Many studies of oligopsony have focused on retailers 
who manage to extract prices and conditions from providers or 
manufacturers that are beneficial to them, but not necessarily to 
consumers. This paper discusses the degree of oligopoly power 
and how the firm tends to wield this power. It also discusses the 
conceptual basis of bilateral oligopoly (oligopoly and oligopsony) 
and some of its economic and welfare effects.
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Oligopoly is usually defined as the market structure which is made up of a few firms. Such firms tend to be relatively large in comparison to other firms in more competitive market 
structures. Oligopsony, on the other hand, is the concentration of 
market buying power in the hands of a few buyers. usually, firms 
in an oligopolistic output market may be operating as oligopsonists 
in an input market. This has very important ramifications for the 
behaviour of such firms in upstream and downstream markets. An 
upstream market may be defined as the market where a firm buys its 
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supplies while a downstream market is a market where the firm sells 
its output. 
Bilateral oligopoly is the market situation where oligopoly and 
oligopsony co-exist, that is, a market structure where the supply side 
is made up of a few sellers and the demand side consisting of a few 
buyers. Such a market structure implies the possibility of the presence 
of countervailing market power, referring to the market power that one 
side of the market develops in reaction to the market power present on 
the other side.
Much has been written about oligopoly although the market structure 
still defies attempts at rationalizing it into a unified model. However, 
there are a number of models, both mainstream and not so mainstream, 
which manage to shed light on this most complex of market structures, 
and it is in the light of these models that I will attempt to treat the 
subject.
First of all, this paper will present the concept of bilateral oligopoly. 
Secondly, some oligopolistic market structure examples found in Malta 
are discussed, as well as local bilateral oligopoly possibilities. It is 
relatively easier to identify oligopolistic structures on the supply side, 
but it is evidently more difficult to identify and discuss oligopsony. 
Thirdly, the existing empirical structure–conduct–performance 
model is presented as a means to help measure the degree of oligopoly/
oligopsony that may exist in a particular market. An attempt is also made 
to use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of seller concentration and adapt 
it to measure buyer concentration, and consequently derive a coefficient 
to measure what I shall refer to as ‘distributed market power (DMP)’. 
Finally, existing theory will be used to present an integrated bilateral 
oligopoly model where the possibility of negotiation is introduced 
together with the possibilities of negotiation in the bilateral oligopolistic 
process and to pose the question of how beneficial is such a structure 
with regards to welfare and efficiency.
This paper is mainly based on a generalized review of the more 
recent documents and papers on bilateral oligopoly and buyer power. 
Other sources include locally published information on particular 
industries as well as interviews with local regulators and chosen 
industry representatives.
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Market structures
A useful model of market structures and market power had been 
provided by Stackelberg as early as 1934. However, the Office of Fair 
Trading in the uK (1998) adapted this model in its research paper 
entitled ‘The Welfare Consequences of the Exercise of Buyer Power’. 
The conceptual model has been further adapted to include Monopolistic 
and Monopsonistic Competition to illustrate the fuller range of market 
structures.
Table 1 – Market Structures
Demand Side 
Form
(Buyers)
Supply-Side Form
(Sellers)
(Many)
Innumerable
(Many)
Numerous
FEW ONE
(Many)
Innumerable
Perfect 
Competition
Monopsonistic
Competition
Oligopoly Monopoly
(Many)
Numerous
Monopsonistic
Competition
Bilateral
Monopsonistic
Competition
Oligopoly/ 
Monopsonistic
Competition
Monopoly/
Monopsonistic
Competition
FEW Oligopsony Monopsonistic
Competition/
Oligopsony
Bilateral
Oligopoly
Bilateral
Monopoly
ONE Monopsony Monopolistic
Competition/
Monopsony
Oligopoly/
Monopsony
Bilateral
Monopoly
Source: OFT UK
Various theories of oligopoly have been advanced over the years. 
Cournot equilibrium is in reality the result of reaction functions by the 
firms involved to the output that the firm believes the other or others 
will produce. In the Cournot model, the market determines the price. 
The Bertrand model is based on the choice of price by the firm, where 
firms in a duopolistic situation competitively bid against each other 
by lowering prices, but not lower than marginal cost. Quantities then 
COuNTERVAILING MARKET POWER
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adjust accordingly. Stackelberg’s model included the advantage of the 
first mover, or of the price leader.
These thinkers on oligopolistic structure have led to the development 
of oligopoly theory. Although initially they tended to assume that 
output was homogenous, competition not dynamic, and production 
free of constraints, these assumptions have been changed in other 
critical models with the intention of providing clearer understanding of 
competitive oligopoly, especially in ever-changing times. Game theory 
has also provided formalization and a more mathematical analysis of 
oligopoly.
It is not the intention of this paper to go into the different theories of 
oligopoly, but it is pertinent to illustrate the characteristics of competitive 
oligopoly. Markets which are concentrated and where few similar 
firms are present tend to demonstrate a high level of interdependence 
among themselves; knowledge is not perfect, there is uncertainty, 
products may or may not be homogenous but are usually differentiated 
through proliferation, and there tends to be a high degree of non-price 
competition. Prices of products may be quite similar, especially if there 
is strong homogeneity of the output and, in many cases, prices tend to 
be rigid in the wake of certain market changes. It is within this backdrop 
that the salient features of this paper will be discussed.
Some aspects of industrial structure in Malta
Malta is a very small country with a population of just over 400,000. 
Markets are therefore objectively small but, given the level of 
entrepreneurship on the island, markets, ranging from corner 
hairdressers to the manufacturing of aluminium apertures, enjoy 
varying degrees of competition. Some markets, such as the electricity 
market, are monopolized while others are oligopolistic or duopolistic 
in nature. Examples of oligopolies in Malta include banks, insurance 
companies, internet-service providers, mobile-service providers, and 
bottled-water companies. This study shall consider aspects of possible 
bilateral oligopoly. Data is available for the supply side but oligopsony 
is difficult to identify.
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Mobile telephony 
As an example of a functioning competitive oligopoly, where there is 
no real countervailing market power on the demand side, the mobile 
telephony sector offers interesting consideration. For example in 
2010, the local mobile telephony penetration rate stood at 110.3 per 
cent. While carrying out this research, five operators provided mobile 
telephony services: Vodafone, Go Mobile, Melita, Red Touch, and Ping. 
Below are their respective market shares.
Table 2 – Mobile Telephony Market Shares
Mobile Telephony Market Shares 
in terms of mobile telephony subscriptions by end 2010
Vodafone
Go Mobile
Melita
Red Touch
Ping
47.88%
41.93%
8.00%
2.03%
0.16%
Source: Malta Communications Authority (MCA) 2010
The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) for mobile telephony in 
Malta is 4119 which shows a very highly concentrated industry. This 
level of concentration makes it a subject for regulation. Suffice it to 
say that the industry started off with one operator, Vodafone, but it was 
a contestable market and Go Mobile followed. However, the regulator 
had to step in and forbid Vodafone from lowering prices before Go 
Mobile’s entry. This was an obvious case of limit pricing where the 
incumbent would have put up an effective barrier to entry. 
This market is very difficult to be subjected to oligopsony because 
buyers in general are too small. Even large customers do not carry 
much clout, although prices and products may be tailored to particular 
schemes offered to closed user groups and bundled products. In fact, 
it is interesting to note that per minute cost of calls is falling in Malta 
from an overall of 17c in SH 2009 to 13.9c in the second half (SH) of 
2010 while number of minutes has risen to 201.2m in SH 2010 from 
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161.7m in SH 2009, but not as fast as in Europe in general. This appears 
to be the general trend. That prices have fallen over time is probably 
owing to regulatory activity such as number portability and open-
time windows, and the entry of the third major competitor, but is also 
suggestive of huge spare capacity in the industry if taken together with 
the consideration of the extremely high level of mobile penetration. 
Supermarkets
Studies that can be carried out to identify bilateral oligopolies in 
Malta may include supermarket retail chains and the wholesale market 
where, in the upstream market, wholesalers are few and the number 
of large supermarkets or supermarket groups are limited. In this case, 
do supermarkets as the buyers in bulk from wholesalers have market 
power, and to what extent are price savings passed on to consumers in 
the downstream market?
On the other hand, can we consider grocers and small self-service 
outlets as fringe buyers in the upstream market and therefore have no 
clout in obtaining discounts from wholesalers? Some smaller grocery 
shops have, in fact, formed a discounter’s cooperative to up their power 
in the market and act as importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailer, 
distributors, and agents as well as grocers, thus contributing to the 
bilateral oligopolistic structure.
This is a very interesting development since the buyer group 
representing the small grocers represents a larger entity, contributing to 
the creation of a bilateral oligopolistic structure. The setting up of the 
cooperative to obtain group discounts falls short of an official merger 
so that in the downstream market where the grocers are the sellers and 
the final consumers are the buyers, there is still competition. However, 
each grocer has his own turf, so that in that restricted area, the structure 
may easily shift into a monopolistically competitive market.
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Tourism
In Malta the organization of tours for tourists also provides an 
interesting study of bilateral oligopoly. Although there are number of 
tour organizers and transport companies, there are only a few large 
tour organizers and large transport companies providing coaches. From 
industry sources, each contract is the result of one-to-one negotiation, 
although that does not rule out the possibility that transport providers 
may collude, or that tour organizers may cooperate. However, given the 
disparate nature of the latter, it is less possible that these do. This is yet 
another field of possible study.
Health Insurance 
Health insurance is offered by few insurance companies and therefore 
constitutes an oligopoly. In discussions with the industry, it transpires 
that the industry attempted to cooperate and thus obtain countervailing 
power. In order to arrive at some sort of standardization of consultant 
and surgeon fees, the health insurance industry in Malta attempted 
to negotiate with the medical profession the professional fees that 
would be charged to the insurance companies. The custom is to charge 
the patient and the patient then makes the claim to the insurance for 
reimbursement. 
In attempting to create a bilateral oligopoly, however, where the 
insurers, as potential buyers negotiating with the sellers, that is, the 
medical profession, a situation would result in agreements on prices 
and conditions in an upstream market which would then be carried on 
to the downstream market. This is where customers deal with insurance 
health service providers. It is not obvious that any benefits that such 
an agreement would give to the insurance companies will be passed 
on to their customers in terms of lower premiums or better insurance 
conditions. 
On the other hand, there could be a transfer of welfare from the 
medical profession to the insurance companies who, already being 
oligopolists, and colluders in the upstream market could abuse their 
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position in the downstream market. It appears that the authorities 
did not permit such overt collusion, not only between suppliers, but 
between the two sides of the market.
The role of consumer cooperatives
The usual way of controlling market power has been through regulation. 
On the one hand, if oligopsony creates a situation that is too one-sided, 
then it stands to reason that oligopsony is regulated, although this is 
usually not the case. On the other hand, consumers are protected from 
seller power through regulation. Can consumer cooperatives form 
the required countervailing power to oligopolistic sellers? Consumer 
cooperatives can negotiate in favour of consumers and possibly lead to 
a redistribution of welfare, especially in increasing consumer surplus.
However, there does remain a very valid problem, namely that of 
the principal-agent problem. Even if, in a consumer cooperative, the 
beneficiaries are the consumers, cooperatives can take lives of their 
own and their administrators may seek to maximize their benefits rather 
than to provide consumers with countervailing power in oligopolistic 
markets.
Consortia
Consortia may be ‘selling consortia’ as well as ‘buying consortia’. 
This is a type of cooperative behaviour usually in relation to a specific 
transaction. Insurance companies, for example, may create a syndicate 
to offer insurance which they would otherwise not be able to provide. 
Buying consortia may also be formed. Consortia formations tend to lead 
to oligopolistic markets and, if there is countervailing market power, 
this may lead to bilateral oligopoly.
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The structure–conduct–performance paradigm
The trend in dealing with imperfectly competitive markets, apart from 
the background provided above, has been in the development of what 
is known as industrial economics or industrial organization. Traditional 
theory explains what happens to market price and quantity, but even 
as we depart from the model of perfect competition, we are unable, 
for example, to determine the supply curve of the firm. Add to this 
price discrimination, barriers to entry, differentiated products, and a 
multitude of strategies, and such theory becomes incapable of dealing 
with the problems of explaining imperfectly competitive markets. For 
example, the model could identify bilateral oligopolistic structure, as 
shown in Table 3.
Table 3 – S–C–P Model
STRUCTURE – CONDUCT – PERFORMANCE MODEL
Structure Conduct Performance
Number of sellers
Number of buyers
Seller concentration
Buyer concentration
Distributed market power 
Degree of homogeneity 
of output
Barriers to entry
Barriers to exit
Degree of vertical 
Integration
Degree of horizontal 
Integration
Pricing strategies:
Price differentiation
Price discrimination
Product strategies:
Product differentiation
Proliferation
Merger activity:
Vertical, horizontal, lateral
Research and development
Promotional activity
Collusive behaviour
Buyer cooperation
Bargaining
Seller consortia
Profitability
Growth
Survival
Market share
Innovation
Efficiency
Economies of scale
Welfare
Consumer (buyer) surplus
In the 1930s, the structure-conduct-performance model was 
developed for understanding the relationships among the firm’s 
environment, its behaviour, and the performance both of the firm and 
of the industry as a whole. The idea is that an industry’s competitive, 
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or less competitive, structure determines the strategies, for example 
pricing and differentiation, that are open to it and the ensuing results, in 
terms for example, of profits or efficiency that are attained. 
A dynamic element was later added to the model when, in the 1980s, 
it was suggested that the relationships among structure, conduct, and 
performance not only flow in one direction but also in the opposite 
direction. Starting from the industry’s structure as a given, firms can, 
through their conduct, for example mergers, influence the industry’s 
structure and, consequently their own and the industry’s performance. 
This approach may define and describe such situations more precisely. 
Since this model may help to analyse bilateral oligopoly, buyers are 
expected to perform an active part in the market, possibly by cooperating 
with one other, bargaining with sellers, and the benefits that are derived 
from this particular conduct in the form of buyer surplus in the form of, 
for example, discounts.
At this point, it is pertinent to state that this involves mainly an 
empirical approach. Economists, however, must be careful to retain 
the discipline that economic theory has given. Einav and Levin stress 
that the use of economic theory and the search for compelling sources 
of identifying variation are not enemies.1 They further declare that, by 
framing the exercise in terms of a coherent economic model, such a model 
may then provide a way to think about the operation of the industry and 
potentially to draw conclusions about policy or general principles.
Countervailing buyer power
Countervailing power is an expression that was coined by Galbraith in his 
American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power.2 It refers 
to the market power that one side of the market develops in reaction 
to the market power present on the other side. Although the concept of 
1 L. Einav and J.D. Levin, ‘Empirical Industrial Organisation: A Progress Report’, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 24(2), 145–62, Spring 2010.
2 J.K. Galbraith, American Capitalism, the Concept of Countervailing Power 
(Boston, 1952).
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countervailing power was quite controversial at the time, and attracted 
criticism from other economists, it has come back to the limelight in view 
of the development of large retail chains that use their market power to 
win more favourable conditions from large and strong suppliers.
Zhiqi Chen defines buyer power as ‘the ability of a buyer to reduce 
the price profitably below a supplier’s normal selling price, or more 
generally the ability to obtain trade terms more favourable than a 
supplier’s normal trade terms’.3
Monopsony is the situation where the buying power is in the hands of 
one buyer, while oligopsony is the case where a few firms can exercise 
buyer power. Economic literature has covered monopsony and has also 
started to cover oligopsony more methodically. Bilateral oligopoly has 
been observed in several markets, but most of them are intermediary 
markets, where final consumers are not directly involved. 
Measurements of concentration
There are a number of measurements of market concentration, with the 
most common being the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, or HHI, which 
measures the size of the firms with regard to the industry as a whole 
by calculating market shares. The market share of each firm is squared 
and the resultant values are then added together in order to give proper 
weighting to larger firms. The HHI may vary between 0, or slightly 
higher in the case of perfectly competitive markets, and 10,000 for 
monopolies. The formula for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is 
𝐻𝐻 = 𝑠𝑠!
!
!
!!!
 
where H is the index, N refers to the number of firms in the market, and 
si refers to the market share of each firm.
3 Zhiqi Chen, ‘Buyer Power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’, Research in 
Law and Economics, A Journal of Policy, Vol. 22, 17–40 (uK, 2007).
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The uS Department of Justice and Federal Trade, in its ‘Horizontal 
Mergers Guidelines’ issued in August 2010 generally classify markets 
into three types. If the HHI is below 1500, then the market is considered 
to be very competitive and not concentrated. Markets with an HHI index 
of between 1500 and 2500 are considered to be moderately concentrated, 
while an HHI over 2500 indicates a highly concentrated market. It is 
pertinent to point out that changes in the HHI are also very important 
for the regulator to make judgements on changing concentrations.
Although the HHI is used for measuring concentration, it has to be 
applied with a certain degree of circumspection. There are a number 
of problems associated with its interpretation. One problem is the case 
of the level of substitutability of the output of the firms in the market 
under consideration. The HHI must assume a degree of homogeneity 
of the product since, if the products of the different firms are highly 
differentiated, the HHI will undervalue the degree of concentration.
Another problem that arises is that of segmentation concentration. If 
the firms service different segments of the market, then once again the 
HHI will undervalue the degree of monopolistic power.
Akio Matsumoto, ugo Merlone, and Ferenc Szidarovsky assert that 
the HHI may in certain cases be inappropriate. One case is where there 
are oligopolies with partially cooperative symmetric firms.4 The index 
does not capture collusive behaviour since it is derived from firms’ 
individual market shares. Secondly, in the semi-symmetric case, there 
is the possibility that cooperation has a decreasing effect on the index.
An HHI for the demand side
The HHI may be used to measure market concentration on the demand 
side. Instead of calculating market share, the contribution to total 
demand by each firm may be taken into account.   
4 Akio Matsumoto, ugo Merlone, and Ferenc Szidarovsky, ‘Some Notes on Applying 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index’, Applied Economics Letters, August (2011).
41
The formula for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the demand 
side is
𝐻𝐻 = 𝑑𝑑!
!
!
!!!
 
where H is the index, N refers to the number of firms in the market, and 
di refers to the contribution to total demand made by each firm.
A possible measurement of distributed market power
From the calculation of the HHI for the supply side (HHI
S
) and the HHI 
for the demand side (HHI
d
), a coefficient of distributed market power 
(C
DMP
) can be derived
𝐶𝐶!"# =
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼!
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼!
 .
The coefficient may have a value ranging from a theoretical 0 to 
infinity. While a value of 0 implies that the supply side has no power at 
all (perfectly competitive), the demand side has a high degree of market 
power. A value of 1 suggests that there is an even distribution of market 
power, while a value greater than 1 sees market power more on the 
supply side of the market. 
In view of the problems and difficulties inherent in the application 
and interpretation of the HHI index in general and of this coefficient in 
particular, while applying this to bilateral oligopoly, it shall be limited 
to markets where there are few firms of roughly the same size, few 
buyers of the same size, and a homogenous product, and where there is 
no inter-firm or inter-buyer cooperation.
COuNTERVAILING MARKET POWER
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An integrated bilateral oligopolistic model 
Going back to the initial market structure model in Table 1 and using the 
last four boxes in the model, it is possible to represent the behaviour of a 
market made up of a few buyers and a few sellers acting collectively or 
independently. In addition, sellers and buyers may negotiate individual 
packages or schemes depending on different conditions which the 
model would still have to identify. Sellers may compete or collude while 
buyers may cooperate with each other or not cooperate, or they may 
enter into negotiations with each other. In each of the quadrants, the use 
of the notional coefficient of distributed market power is represented in 
brackets.
Table 4 – An Integrated Bilateral Oligopolistic Model
FEW SELLERS
FEW
BUYERS
Compete Negotiate Collude
Not Cooperate Bilateral
Oligopoly
(C
DMP 
= 1
(with cmp)
– Monopoly
Oligopsony
(C
DMP 
> 1)
Negotiate – Individual
Negotiation
(C
DMP 
ind)
–
Cooperate Oligopoly
Monopsony
(C
DMP 
< 1)
– Bilateral
Monopoly
(C
DMP 
= 1)
cmp – countervailing market power ind – indeterminate   C
DMP
 – Coefficient of 
Distributed Market Power
This model attempts to give a structure to the analysis of bilateral 
oligopoly. There is no generalized theory that adequately explains 
oligopolistic behaviour, let alone one which explains bilateral 
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oligopolistic behaviour. If collusion or cooperation were to take place, 
then the models of monopoly and monopsony could provide a basis on 
which to model behaviour. However, non-collusive and non-cooperative 
behaviour, as well as individualized negotiation, are extremely difficult 
to model and therefore require deeper investigation. 
Welfare and efficiency considerations
From the literature, it is not clear whether countervailing market power 
increases overall welfare, decreases it, or leaves it unchanged. Models 
which involve market power, such as monopoly and monopsony, tend to 
show that imperfections in the market lead to deadweight welfare losses. 
This is in line with the concept that the greatest level of welfare and 
efficiency that markets can offer is when they are perfectly competitive.
However, does countervailing power lead to stemming welfare losses 
arising from the power of sellers in the market? And will oligopolists 
transfer their acquired benefits to the consumer?
According to the literature reviewed by Chen5 which consists 
mainly of papers by ungern-Steinberg,6 Dobson, Waterson and Chu,7 
and Erutku8 efficiency, cost reductions, price benefits, product variety, 
innovation, and welfare gains among others depend on many different 
considerations. How concentrated are the markets on either side? Is there 
one large supplier or buyer and other fringe buyers? Are oligoponists 
in the upstream market oligopolists in the downstream market where 
consumers have no market power? If there are gains to be made through 
bilateral oligopoly, are these gains passed on the final consumer, and 
if so, in what ways? In fact, are all consumers affected in the same 
5 Chen.
6 T. von ungem-Stemberg, ‘Countervailing power revisited’, International Journal 
of Industrial Organization, Vol. 14 (1996), 507–20.
7 P. Dobson, M. Waterson, and A. Chu, The Welfare Consequences of the Exercise of 
Buying Power, Office of Fair Trading, Research Paper 16, OFT (London, 1998).
8 C. Erutku, ‘Buying Power and Strategic Interactions’. Canadian Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 38 (2205), 1160–72.
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manner? Or do some consumers pay certain prices while consumers 
who buy from fringe sellers are castigated because these have no or 
little bargaining power? 
Andresen, Asche, Roll, and Tveteras adopt a methodological 
approach to the estimation of market power and provide an empirical 
application to the European dry salted cod market. They conclude that 
where both seller and buyer have market power, the quantity traded will 
be lower compared to a situation where only one side has market power.9 
Therefore, in such a situation, the oligopolist’s negative influence on 
quantity traded will be reinforced if the oligopsonist reduces the market 
price of the good by reducing the quantity it purchases. This entails 
a welfare loss as it results in a lower quantity available of the final 
product as compared to the quantity available under competition.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to highlight bilateral oligopoly as a market 
structure and how the presence or absence of countervailing power tends 
to distort the market by having unevenly distributed market power.
In summary, bilateral oligopoly has been defined primarily as a 
market structure with few buyers and sellers having countervailing 
market power. Insights into some of Malta’s oligopolistic structures 
have helped to show that it is possible to develop an understanding 
of the market with the existing theories and by integrating empirical 
elements especially for the purpose of testing the theories as required.
The development of the coefficient of distributed market power 
shows the notional measurement of countervailing market power, the 
degree of its presence or absence.
The integrated model of bilateral oligopoly takes into account the 
reality of negotiation and bargaining as a manner of how such a market 
may conduct itself.
9 T.B. Andersen, F. Asche, K.H. Roll, and S. Tveteras, Oligopoly and Oligopsony in 
Concentrated Supply Chains (Peru, 2009).
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As organizations become larger and cater for greater market shares, 
and as markets continue to grow both domestically and globally, the 
development of oligopoly and oligopsony models is becoming more 
important in the formulation of economic theory. ultimately, a better 
understanding of these models will make economic theory of markets 
more relevant to entrepreneurs, managers, consumers, regulators and 
policy makers.
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